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1On Secure Source Coding with Side
Information at the Encoder
Yeow-Khiang Chia∗ and Kittipong Kittichokechai†
Abstract
We consider a secure source coding problem with side information (S.I.) at the decoder and the
eavesdropper. The encoder has a source that it wishes to describe with limited distortion through a rate
limited link to a legitimate decoder. The message sent is also observed by the eavesdropper. The encoder
aims to minimize both the distortion incurred by the legitimate decoder; and the information leakage rate
at the eavesdropper. When the encoder has access to the uncoded S.I. at the decoder, we characterize the
rate-distortion-information leakage rate (R.D.I.) region under a Markov chain assumption and when S.I.
at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion region as compared to the case when S.I. is absent.
When the decoder also has access to the eavesdropper’s S.I., we characterize the R.D.I. region without
the Markov Chain condition. We then consider a related setting where the encoder and decoder obtain
coded S.I. through a rate limited helper, and characterize the R.D.I. region for several special cases,
including special cases under logarithmic loss distortion and for special cases of the Quadratic Gaussian
setting. Finally, we consider the amplification measures of list or entropy constraint at the decoder, and
show that the R.D.I. regions for the settings considered in this paper under these amplification measures
coincide with R.D.I. regions under per symbol logarithmic loss distortion constraint at the decoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the secure lossy source coding problem with S.I. at the decoders in Figure 1. The encoder has
source Xn that it wishes to describe lossily through a rate limited link to decoder 1 (legitimate decoder).
The message sent is also observed by decoder 2, which is an eavesdropper in our setup. The encoder
aims to minimize the distortion incurred by decoder 1 in reconstructing the source sequence, while at
the same time, minimize the information leakage rate at the eavesdropper given its S.I. and the common
message M : I(Xn;M,Zn)/n.
The problem of source coding with security constraints has received attention in recent years, [1]–[4],
due to potential applications in areas such as privacy in sensor networks and databases. For example, [5]
approached the issue of privacy in databases from an information theoretic perspective, using the infor-
mation leakage rate as a privacy measure. The use of the information leakage rate as a measure of privacy
has also found applications in the area of smart grid, and in particular, privacy for smart meters. We refer
interested readers to [6], [7], [8] and the references therein for work in this area. Among the literature on
secure source coding, of particular relevance to this work are the papers [3] and [4]. In [3], the authors
considered our setting when S.I. Y n is unavailable at the encoder and gave the full characterization of
the rate-distortion-information leakage rate (R.D.I.) region for discrete memoryless sources and arbitrary
distortion measures. [4] considered both the case when S.I. Y n is available at the encoder and the case
when S.I. Y n is unavailable at encoder. However, the authors were interested in the information leakage
rate for the S.I., I(Y n;M,Zn)/n, instead of I(Xn;M,Zn)/n. As we will discuss in the sequel, the
differences give rise to a new role, that of generating secret key from common randomness [9], for the
S.I. observed at the encoder and decoder.
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A particular distortion measure that we will focus on in this paper is the logarithmic loss (log-loss)
distortion measure, first proposed in [10]. Log-loss has the interesting property that S.I. at the encoder
does not improve the rate-distortion region, with respect to the Wyner-Ziv setting [11] where S.I. is absent
at the encoder. This property will be key in establishing the results in this paper. Following [12] and [13],
we will also extend our work to consider source amplification measures for our setting. We consider the
amplification measures of list constraint [14], and the block entropy constraint, H(Xn|M,Y n)/n, at the
decoder. Interestingly, we find, for our settings, that the R.D.I. region is the same regardless of whether
one uses symbol by symbol log-loss or the above amplification measures.
The rest of this paper is as follow. We first provide formal definitions in Section II. Our main results
are then given in the subsequent sections and summarized here:
• In Section III, we consider our setting in Figure 1 when the eavesdropper’s S.I. is not available at
the legitimate decoder. General inner and outer bounds are given for this setup and the R.D.I. region
is characterized when these conditions hold: (i) a Markov Chain X − Y − Z between the source
and the side informations; and (ii) S.I. at the encoder does not improve the rate distortion region.
• Section IV considers the setting where the eavesdropper’s S.I. is available at the decoder (Figure 1
with the switch closed). We characterize the R.D.I. region when S.I. at the encoder does not improve
the rate distortion region.
• Section V considers the setting in Figure 2, where the encoder and decoder obtain coded S.I. sent
by a helper via a rate-limited link. We present a general achievability scheme for this setting and
show that the achievability scheme is optimal for some distortion measures when the source and
S.I.s satisfy certain Markov Chain conditions. We also extend our analysis for this setting to the
Quadratic Gaussian case, and characterize the R.D.I. regions for some special cases.
• In Section VI, we consider the amplification measures listed in the previous paragraph, and show
that the R.D.I. regions under the amplification measures are the same as that under log-loss for the
settings considered in this paper.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. DEFINITIONS
We will follow the notation in [15]. Throughout this paper, source and side informations (Xn, Y n, Zn,W n)
are assumed to be i.i.d.; i.e. p(xn, yn, zn, wn) =
∏n
i=1 p(xi, yi, zi, wi). We now give definitions for the
case when the switch is opened; i.e. only Y n is available at the decoder.
A. Uncoded S.I. case (Figure 1)
An (n, 2nR) code for this setup consists of
• A stochastic encoder Fe that takes (Xn, Y n) as input and generates M ∈ [1 : 2nR] according to a
conditional pmf p(m|xn, yn); and
• A decoder fD : M × Yn → Xˆ n.
The expected distortion incurred by the code is given by E d(Xn, Xˆn) :=
∑n
i=1Ed(Xi, Xˆi)/n, where
d : X×Xˆ → [0,∞) is the per symbol distortion measure. The information leakage rate at the eavesdropper
is given by I(Xn;M,Zn)/n. A (R,D,∆) R.D.I. tuple is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of (n, 2nR) codes such that
lim sup
n→∞
E d(Xn, Xˆn) ≤ D, (1)
lim sup
n→∞
I(Xn;Zn,M)
n
≤ ∆. (2)
2
PSfrag replacements
Enc.
Eaves.
Dec.
Enc
Xn
R
Zn
Y n
Rh
Xˆn
W n
Helper
I(Xn;M,Zn)
nI(Xn;M,Wn)
n
Fig. 1: Uncoded S.I. at the encoder. When the switch is opened, this figure corresponds to the setting
described in Section II-A. When the switch is closed, this figure corresponds to the setting described in
Section II-B
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Fig. 2: Coded S.I. at the encoder.
The rate-distortion-information leakage rate (R.D.I.) region is then defined as the closure of all achievable
(R,D,∆) tuples.
Remark 2.1: Another definition of uncertainty used by some authors in the case of discrete memoryless
sources is the equivocation rate, defined by H(Xn|M,Zn)/n. Our information leakage rate definition is
equivalent to the equivocation rate, since H(Xn)/n = H(X) is fixed.
B. When Zn is also available at the decoder
This setting refers to Figure 1 with the switch closed. When Zn is also available at the encoder, all
of the definitions remain the same with the exception of the decoding function, which is now changed
to fD :M × Yn ×Zn → Xˆ n, since the S.I. Zn is also available at the decoder.
C. Rate limited helper case (Figure 2)
The rate limited helper setting is shown in Figure 2. An (n, 2nR, 2nRh) code for this setup consists of
• A stochastic helper encoder Fh that takes Y n as input and outputs Mh ∈ [1 : 2nRh ] according to
the conditional pmf p(mh|yn);
• A stochastic encoder Fe that takes (Xn,Mh) as input and generates M ∈ [1 : 2nR] according to
the conditional pmf p(m|xn,mh);
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• A decoder fD : M ×Mh ×Zn → Xˆ n.
The definitions of expected distortion incurred by the decoder and information leakage rate at the
eavesdropper are the same as previous setting, with Zn replaced by W n for the information leakage
rate. A (R,Rh,D,∆) tuple is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (n, 2nR, 2nRh) codes
such that (1) and (2) are satisfied. The R.D.I. region is then defined as the closure of all achievable
(R,Rh,D,∆) tuples.
Remark 2.2: It should be noted that the rate limited helper setting does not include the previous setting
as a special case. The helper encoder is a stochastic encoder. Hence, it can choose to send independent
randomness instead of transmitting the Y n sequence to the encoder and the decoder.
D. Side information and rate distortion region
Let Y˜ n be another i.i.d. random variable such that (Xn, Y˜ n) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(xi, y˜i). Let RWZ(D) be the
rate-distortion function for the Wyner-Ziv setting (see [15, Chapter 11]) where S.I. Y˜ n is available at the
decoder only. Let RSI−Enc(D) be the rate-distortion function when Y˜ n is also available at the encoder.
We say that S.I. at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion region for side information Y˜ n
if RWZ(D) = RSI−Enc(D) for all D ≥ Dmin, where Dmin is the minimum achievable distortion. We
denote this condition by RWZ(Y˜ ) = RSI−Enc(Y˜ ), where RWZ(Y˜ ) is the rate distortion region when Y˜ n is
available at the decoder only, and RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) is the rate distortion region when Y˜ n is available at both the
encoder and the decoder. Equivalently, we have RWZ(Y˜ ) ⊆ RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) and RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) ⊆ RWZ(Y˜ ).
The following information-theoretic characterization of RWZ(Y˜ ) = RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) will be useful in the
sequel. RWZ(Y˜ ) = RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) if for all D ≥ 0, there exists an auxiliary random variable V and
reconstruction function xˆ(V, Y˜ ) such that
I(X;V |Y˜ ) = RSI−Enc(D)
= min
p(xˆ|x,y˜):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D
I(X; Xˆ |Y˜ ),
with V −X − Y˜ and E d(X, xˆ(V, Y˜ )) ≤ D.
III. UNCODED S.I. AT ENCODER AND DECODER WITH SWITCH OPENED
In this section, we present results for the setting in Figure 1 with the switch opened.
A. General inner and outer bounds
Proposition 1: An outer bound to the R.D.I. region for the setting in Figure 1 with the switch opened
is given by
R ≥ I(X;U, V |Y ),
∆ ≥ max


I(X;Z),
I(X;Z, V, U) + I(V ;Z|U)
−I(V ;Y |U)−H(Y |U, V,X,Z)

 ,
for some p(x, y, z)p(u, v|x, y) and reconstruction function xˆ(Y,U, V ) satisfying E d(X, xˆ(Y,U, V )) ≤ D.
The cardinalities of U and V may be upper bounded by |U| ≤ |X ||Y| + 2 and |V| ≤ |X ||Y|+ 2.
Proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix A.
We now present an inner bound (achievability scheme) for this setting.
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Proposition 2: An inner bound to the R.D.I. region for the setting in Figure 1 with the switch opened
is given by
R > I(X;U, V |Y ),
∆ > I(X;Z,U) + I(V ;X|U, Y )−RK ,
where RK = min{I(V ;X|U, Y ),H(Y |U, V,X,Z)} for p(u, v, x, y, z) = p(x, y)p(u, v|x, y)p(z|x, y)
and reconstruction function xˆ(Y,U, V ) satisfying E d(X, xˆ(Y,U, V )) ≤ D.
Proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. Here, we give some intuition behind the general achiev-
ability scheme. The encoder sends two layers of descriptions Un and V n to the decoder, which decodes
by successive decoding. This results in rates of I(X;U |Y ) for the first Un layer and I(V ;X|U, Y ) for
the second layer. We assume that the eavesdropper is able to decode the Un codeword, resulting in side
information (Zn, Un) at the eavesdropper. S.I. Y n is binned to 2nRK bins to generated a secret key.
This key can be kept secret from the eavesdropper if RK ≤ H(Y |U, V,X,Z), and it is then used to
scramble the message sent to the decoder about the V n layer of codewords. This operation increases
the uncertainty that the eavesdropper has about the V n codewords. The information leakage rate is then
upper bounded by I(X;Z,U) plus I(V ;X|U, Y )−RK . I(V ;X|U, Y ) is an upper bound on the leakage
rate due to the V n codeword if no scrambling was done, while −RK represents the reduction in the
leakage rate due to the secret key scrambling operation.
Remark 3.1: The reader may ask why we did not scramble the first layer of codewords. A straight-
forward way of scrambling the first layer of codewords as well as the second layer is to define in the
inner bound U = ∅ and V ′ = (V,U). Such a scheme leads to the following R.D.I. trade-off.
R > I(V ′;X|Y )
= I(V,U ;X|Y ),
∆ > I(X;Z) + I(V ′;X|Y )−RK
= I(X;Z) + I(V,U ;X|Y )−RK ,
where RK = min{I(V ;X|U, Y ),H(Y |U, V,X,Z)}.
Remark 3.2: As a sanity check, it is easy to see that if we set Y = ∅, Propositions 1 and 2 allow us
to recover a special case of the result in [3], where S.I. is not available at the encoder. The R.D.I. region
in this case is given as
R ≥ I(X;V ),
∆ ≥ I(X;Z, V ) + I(V ;Z)
for some p(x, y, z)p(v|x, y) and reconstruction function xˆ(Y, V ) satisfying E d(X, xˆ(Y, V )) ≤ D. The
cardinality of V may be upper bounded by |V| ≤ |X ||Y|+ 2.
B. R.D.I. regions
Proposition 3: For the setting in Figure 1 with the switch opened, if X − Y −Z and RSI−Enc(Y ) =
RWZ(Y ), the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ RSI−Enc(D),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) +RSI−Enc(D)−H(Y |X,Z)}.
Here, RSI−Enc(D) = minp(xˆ|x,y):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D I(X; Xˆ |Y ).
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Proof of this Proposition follows from tightening the outer bound in Proposition 1 using the two conditions
and showing achievability using Proposition 2.
Proof: From Proposition 1, we have
∆ ≥ I(X;Z, V, U) + I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U)
−H(Y |U, V,X,Z)
(a)
≥ I(X;Z, V, U) + I(V,U ;Z)− I(V,U ;Y )
−H(Y |U, V,X,Z)
= I(X;Z) + I(X;V,U |Z) + I(V,U ;Z) − I(V,U ;Y )
−H(Y |U, V,X,Z)
= I(X;Z) + I(X;V,U) − I(V,U ;Y )
−H(Y |U, V,X,Z) + I(Z;V,U |X)
= I(X;Z) + I(X,Y ;V,U)− I(Y ;V,U |X) − I(V,U ;Y )
−H(Y |X,Z) + I(Y ;V,U |X,Z) + I(Z;V,U |X)
= I(X;Z) + I(X;V,U |Y )−H(Y |X,Z)
− I(Y ;V,U |X) + I(Z, Y ;V,U |X)
= I(X;Z) + I(X;V,U |Y )−H(Y |X,Z)
(b)
≥ I(X;Z) + I(X; Xˆ |Y )−H(Y |X,Z)
≥ I(X;Z) +RSI−Enc(D)−H(Y |X,Z).
(a) follows from the Markov Chain assumption; (b) follows from Xˆ being a function of (V,U, Y );
the final step follows from the fact that RSI−Enc(D) = minp(xˆ|x),E d(Xˆ,X) I(X; Xˆ |Y ). Similarly, from
Proposition 1, a lower bound on R is given by
R ≥ I(X;V,U |Y )
≥ RSI−Enc(D).
This completes the proof of converse.
Achievability follows from Proposition 2 and the assumption that RSI−Enc(Y ) = RWZ(Y ). Since
RSI−Enc(Y ) = RWZ(Y ), there exists a V ∗ and reconstruction function x∗(V ∗, Y ) such that V ∗ −X −
(Y,Z), I(X;V ∗|Y ) = RWZ(D) = RSI−Enc(D) and E d(X, xˆ∗(V, Y, Z)) ≤ D for all D ≥ Dmin. It is
now straightforward to verify that the R.D.I. region stated in the Proposition can be achieved by setting
U = ∅, V = V ∗ and using the Markov relation V ∗ −X − (Y,Z).
Remark 3.3: The S.I. at the encoder has, in general, dual uses. One use is to allow the encoder to
reduce the rate needed to achieve a level of distortion at the decoder, and the other use here is to
generate a secret key. There is, in general, a tension between these two uses of the S.I.. The assumption
of RSI−Enc(Y ) = RWZ(Y ) removes some of this tension, allowing us to characterize the R.D.I. region
under certain conditions. This is a recurring theme in this paper.
C. Examples
We now provide two examples involving canonical sources and distortion measures in information
theory that satisfy the two assumptions stated in the previous subsection.
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Corollary 1: Let X−Y −Z and Y be an erased version of X. That is Y = X with probability 1−pe,
and e with probability pe. Let |Xˆ | = |X | and the distortion measure be the Hamming distance:
d(X, Xˆ) =
{
0 if Xˆ = X
1 if Xˆ 6= X
.
Then, the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ peI(X; Xˆ),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) + peI(X; Xˆ)−H(Y |X,Z)}
for 0 ≤ D ≤ pe, p(xˆ|x) such that E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D/pe.
Proof: The proof follows from an application of Proposition 3 and a result in [16, Theorem 6]. Since
X − Y − Z by assumption, it remains to check that RSI−Enc(Y ) = RWZ(Y ), which follows from [16,
Theorem 6]. Further, [16, Theorem 6] states that RSI−Enc(D) = peminp(xˆ|x):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D/pe I(X; Xˆ).
Corollary 2: Let X − Y − Z and let the distortion measure be given by the log-loss distortion [10].
That is, the reconstruction alphabet is a vector representing the set of probability distributions of the
source X. Thus, xˆ(x), 1 ≤ x ≤ |X |, represents the x component of the vector xˆ that gives the estimated
probability of X = x. Then, the log-loss measure is defined by
d(x, xˆ) = log
1
xˆ(x)
.
With this distortion measure, the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ [H(X|Y )−D]+,
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) +H(X|Y )−D −H(Y |X,Z)}.
Proof: This result follows again from a straightforward application of Proposition 3. The fact that
RSI−Enc(Y ) = RWZ(Y ) for arbitrary discrete memoryless X,Y under logarithmic loss follows from
results in [10]. Further, [10] showed that RSI−Enc(D) = [H(X|Y )−D]+.
Remark 3.4: Technically, our proof of achievability in Proposition 2 holds only for bounded distortion
measures, and log-loss is not a bounded distortion measure. The proof of achievability can be readily
extended to log-loss by perturbing the reconstruction probability distribution, as was done in an earlier
version of [17]. Fix a desired p(u, v|x, y) in Proposition 2. For every u ∈ U , v ∈ V and y ∈ Y , define
X1(u, v, y) := {x : p(x|u, v, y) > 0} and X0(u, v, y) := {x : p(x|u, v, y) = 0}. Further, let ǫ > 0 be a
number such that ǫ < (1− ǫ)minu,v,y,x∈X1(u,v,y) p(x|u, v, y). Then, we define
xˆ(x) :=
{
(1− |X0|(u,v,y)|X | ǫ)p(x|u, v, y) for x ∈ X1
ǫ
|X | for x ∈ X0
.
It is then easy to see that the maximum distortion we incur is upper bounded by log(|X |/ǫ). The proof in
Proposition 2 can then be applied with this reconstruction function. Following the proof in Proposition 2,
let p(n)e be the probability of “error”; that is, the probability that the chosen codewords are not jointly
typical with (Xn, Y n) or that the decoder makes an error. Then, for n sufficiently large, the expected
distortion under log-loss with the chosen reconstruction function is upper bounded by
E d(Xn, xˆn(Un, V n, Y n)) ≤ D + δ(ǫ) + p(n)e log
(
|X |
ǫ
)
.
7
Since p(n)e → 0 as n→∞, this completes the proof for the case of log-loss.
Remark 3.5: For the case of log-loss, by letting D → 0, we can also recover the lossless source
coding case. That is, when the criteria at the decoder is the block error probability P(Xˆn 6= Xn) → 0
as n→∞. Proof of this claim follows from Proposition 13 in Section V relating log-loss in this setting
to list decoding.
Numerical examples for Corollaries 1 and 2
As concrete numerical examples, we consider X ∈ Bern(1/2), pe = 0.8 and Z ∈ {0, 1} with P(Z =
0|Y = 0) = 1, P(Z = 1|Y = 1) = 1 and P(Z = 0|Y = e) = 0.5. We then have the following R.D.I.
regions for the two corollaries.
1) Numerical example for Corollary 1: The R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ pe
(
1−H2
(
D
pe
))
,
∆ ≥ max
{
1−H2(pe/2), 1 −H2(pe/2) + pe
(
1−H2
(
D
pe
))
− (1−
pe
2
)H2
(
0.5pe
1− pe2
)}
for D ≤ pe/2. For D > pe/2, R = 0 and ∆ = 1 −H2(pe/2). Here, H2(.) represents the binary
entropy function.
2) Numerical example for Corollary 2: The R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ [pe −D]
+,
∆ ≥ max
{
1−H2(pe/2), 1 −H2(pe/2) + pe −D − (1−
pe
2
)H2
(
0.5pe
1− pe2
)}
for D ≥ 0.
The optimal information leakage rate-distortion tradeoffs for both examples are plotted in Fig. 3.
IV. UNCODED S.I. AT ENCODER AND DECODER WITH SWITCH CLOSED
We now turn our attention to the case where the eavesdropper’s side information is also available at
the decoder. We note here that this setting is closely related to the setting considered in the previous
section. However, this setting cannot be recovered as a special case of the setting in the previous
section. One cannot, for example, define Y˜ = (Y,Z) as a super-source since that would mean that
the eavesdropper’s side information would also be available at the encoder. Using the results of this
section and the previous section, we show that when RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z), knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s side information at the encoder does not change the R.D.I. region (for the setting in
Figure 1 with the switch closed).
A. Inner and outer bounds
We first start with an inner bound.
Proposition 4: An inner bound to the R.D.I. region for the setting in Figure 1 with the switch closed
is given by
R > I(X;U, V |Y,Z),
∆ > I(X;Z,U) + I(V ;X|U, Y, Z) −RK ,
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Fig. 3: Optimal ∆ and D tradeoff for the numerical examples given for Corollaries 1 and 2. The blue
line with triangles corresponds to the numerical example for Corollary 1, while the red line with squares
corresponds to the numerical example for Corollary 2.
where RK = min{I(V ;X|U, Y, Z),H(Y |U, V,X,Z)} for p(u, v)p(u, v|x, y) and reconstruction function
xˆ(Y,Z,U, V ) satisfying E d(X, xˆ(Y,Z,U, V )) ≤ D.
We omit the proof of this proposition here, as the achievability scheme is largely similar to the achiev-
ability scheme of Proposition 2, with the difference being that the decoder has access to side informations
(Y n, Zn). Hence, the decoder uses the side informations Y n and Zn in decoding the codeword from the
encoder, as opposed to just using the side information Y n. Similarly, Zn is also used in the reconstruction.
The rest of the achievability scheme follows the same steps as that in Proposition 2.
Next, we turn to an outer bound for this setting.
Proposition 5: An outer bound to the R.D.I. region for the setting in Figure 1 with the switch closed
is given by
R ≥ I(X;V |Y,Z),
∆ ≥ max {I(X;Z), I(X;Z) + I(X;V |Y,Z)−H(Y |X,Z)} ,
for some p(x, y, z)p(v|x, y) and reconstruction function xˆ(Y,Z, V ) satisfying E d(X, xˆ(Y,Z, V )) ≤ D.
The cardinality of V may be upper bounded by |V| ≤ |X ||Y|+ 2.
Proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix D.
B. R.D.I. regions
Using Propositions 4 and 5, we characterize the R.D.I. regions for sources and distortion measures
satisfying RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z).
Proposition 6: For the setting in Figure 1 with the switch closed, when RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z),
the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ RSI−Enc(D),
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∆ ≥ max {I(X;Z), I(X;Z) +RSI−Enc(D)−H(Y |X,Z)} .
Here, RSI−Enc(D) = minp(xˆ|x,y,z):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D I(X; Xˆ |Y,Z).
Proof: From the outer bound in Proposition 5, we have
R ≥ I(X;V |Y,Z)
≥ I(X; Xˆ |Y,Z)
≥ RSI−Enc(D).
Similarly, we have
∆ ≥ max {I(X;Z), I(X;Z) +RWZ(D)−H(Y |X,Z)} .
Achievability of this outer bound then follows from Proposition 4 and the assumption thatRSI−Enc(Y,Z) =
RWZ(Y,Z). SinceRSI−Enc(Y,Z) = RWZ(Y,Z), there exists a V ∗ and reconstruction function x∗(V ∗, Y, Z)
such that V ∗ − X − (Y,Z), I(X;V ∗|Y,Z) = RWZ(D) = RSI−Enc(D) and E d(X, xˆ∗(V, Y, Z)) ≤ D
for all D ≥ Dmin. We then set U = ∅ and V = V ∗ in the inner bound in Proposition 4 to show the
achievability of the outer bound.
Under the condition that RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z), Proposition 6 and Proposition 3 allow us to
show that the R.D.I. region of the setting in Figure 1 does not change even if the eavesdropper’s S.I. is
available to both the encoder and the decoder. This is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 7: For the setting in Figure 1 with the switch closed, if RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z),
the R.D.I. region remains unchanged even if Zn is available at the encoder.
Proof: Proof of this Proposition follows quite straightforwardly from Proposition 3. We let the side
information observed by the decoder be the super source Y˜ n = (Y n, Zn). Observe that since X− Y˜ −Z
and RWZ(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Y,Z) implies that RWZ(Y˜ ) = RSI−Enc(Y˜ ), the results of Proposition 3
holds and the eavesdropper’s S.I. Zn now becomes available to both the encoder and the decoder. It
is now straightforward to see from Proposition 3 that the R.D.I. region is the same as that given in
Proposition 6.
C. Examples
We now give examples of sources and distortion measures satisfying the condition RWZ(Y,Z) =
RSI−Enc(Y,Z).
Corollary 3: Let X−Z−Y and Z be an erased version of X. That is Z = X with probability 1−pe,
and e with probability pe. Let |Xˆ | = |X | and the distortion measure be the Hamming distance, as defined
in Corollary 1. Then, the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ peI(X; Xˆ),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) + peI(X; Xˆ)−H(Y |Z)}
for 0 ≤ D ≤ pe, p(xˆ|x) such that E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D/pe.
Proof: Proof of this Corollary follows similar lines to that of Corollary 1. However, we first show
that knowledge of S.I. Y n at both the encoder and the decoder does not improve the rate-distortion region,
when S.I. Zn is also known at the encoder and decoder and X−Z−Y form a Markov Chain. When S.I.s
Zn and Y n are known at both the encoder and the decoder, the rate distortion function, RSI−Enc(D), is
given as
RSI−Enc(D) = min I(X; Xˆ |Y,Z),
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where the minimization is over p(xˆ|x, y, z) satisfying E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D. Note now that using the Markov
Chain X − Z − Y , we have that I(X; Xˆ |Y,Z) ≥ I(X; Xˆ |Z). Since I(X; Xˆ |Z) and E d(X, Xˆ) depend
on only the marginal p.m.f. p(x, z, xˆ), the rate distortion function can be equivalently written as
RSI−Enc(D) = min
p(xˆ|x,z):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D
I(X; Xˆ |Z).
Hence, S.I. Y n does not improve the rate-distortion region when the Markov Chain X − Z − Y holds,
and we have RSI−Enc(Y,Z) = RSI−Enc(Z).
Using the result in [16, Theorem 6], we have RSI−Enc(Z) = RWZ(Z). Next, noting that RWZ(Z) ⊆
RWZ(Y,Z) ⊆ RSI−Enc(Y,Z) then give us the required condition RSI−Enc(Y,Z) = RWZ(Y,Z).
Finally, we apply Proposition 6 and [16, Theorem 6] to obtain the R.D.I. region in Corollary 3.
Remark 4.1: In this example, the eavesdropper’s S.I., Zn, is of higher quality than the S.I. observed
by the encoder and decoder, Y n. Y n therefore plays no role in reducing the achievable rate for a given
distortion. However, because Y n is observed at both the encoder and decoder, it can still help to reduce
the information leakage rate, despite it being a degraded version of Zn.
Our next example deals with the case where both Y and Z are erased versions of X.
Corollary 4: Let Y be an erased version of X. That is Y = X with probability 1− pe,y, and e with
probability pe,y. Similarly, let Z be an erased version of X, independent of Y conditioned on X. That is
Z = X with probability 1− pe,z, and e with probability pe,z. Let |Xˆ | = |X | and the distortion measure
be the Hamming distance as defined in Corollary 1. Then, the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ pe,ype,zI(X; Xˆ),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) + pe,ype,zI(X; Xˆ)−H(Y |X)}
for 0 ≤ D ≤ pe,ype,z, p(xˆ|x) such that E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D/(pe,ype,z).
Proof: Similar to Corollary 3, we use Proposition 6 to prove this result. It remains to check that
RSI−Enc(Y,Z) = RWZ(Y,Z) when Y and Z are both erased versions of X. This fact is a straightforward
extension of the arguments in [16, Theorem 6]. We therefore omit it here.
Remark 4.2: It may be of interest to compare Corollary 4 to the setting in Figure 1 when the switch is
opened, with the side information at the decoder being replaced by the following erased side information:
Y˜ = X with probability 1− pe,ype,z and e with probability pe,ype,z, and X − Y˜ −Z . In this case, from
Corollary 1, the R.D.I. region is given by
Ropen ≥ pe,ype,zI(X; Xˆ),
∆open ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) + pe,ype,zI(X; Xˆ)−H(Y˜ |X,Z)}
for 0 ≤ D ≤ pe,ype,z, p(xˆ|x) such that E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D/(pe,ype,z). In this case, the expression for Ropen
is the same as that for R in Corollary 4. This is to be expected since, for rate distortion, observing two
erased side informations Y and Z is equivalent to observing a higher quality erased side information
Y˜ . However, the information leakage rate expressions are different, since H(Y˜ |X,Z) is in general not
equal to H(Y |Z). Hence, due to the required Markov Chain assumption (X− Y˜ −Z) in Corollary 1, the
result in Corollary 4 cannot be recovered from Corollary 1 by simply assuming a higher quality erased
side information at the decoder.
Our final example deals with the setting under log-loss.
Corollary 5: For the setting in Figure 1 with the switch closed, let the distortion measure be given by
the log-loss distortion as defined in Corollary 2. The R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ [H(X|Y,Z)−D]+,
∆ ≥ max{I(X;Z), I(X;Z) +H(X|Y,Z) −D −H(Y |X,Z)},
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where [x]+ := max{0, x}.
Proof: The proof follows similar lines to the proof in Corollary 2, with the role of Proposition 3
being replaced by Proposition 6. The fact that RSI−Enc(Y,Z) = RWZ(Y,Z) follows again from results
in [10], by consider (Y,Z) as a super source Y˜ . Further, using the results in [10], we have RSI−Enc(D) =
[H(X|Y,Z) −D]+.
Numerical examples for Corollaries 3, 4 and 5
We now give numerical examples for the three corollaries. For all three examples, we assume that
X ∼ Bern(0.5).
1) Numerical example for Corollary 3: We let Z = X with probability 1− pe and e with probability
pe, with pe = 0.8. Y ∈ {0, 1} with P(Y = 0|Z = 0) = 1, P(Y = 1|Z = 1) = 1 and P(Y =
0|Z = e) = 0.9. The R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ pe
(
1−H2
(
D
pe
))
,
∆ ≥ max
{
1− pe, 1− pe + pe
(
1−H2
(
D
pe
))
− peH2(0.9)
}
for D ≤ pe/2. R = 0 and ∆ = 1− pe for D > pe/2.
2) Numerical example for Corollary 4: We let Z = X with probability 1−pe,z and e with probability
pe,z, with pe,z = 0.8. We let Y = X with probability 1 − pe,y and e with probability pe,y, with
pe,y = 0.9. The R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥ pe,ype,z
(
1−H2
(
D
pe,ype,z
))
,
∆ ≥ max
{
1− pe,z, 1− pe,z + pe,ype,z
(
1−H2
(
D
pe,ype,z
))
−H2(pe,y)
}
for D ≤ pe,ype,z/2. R = 0 and ∆ = 1− pe,z for D > pe,ype,z/2.
3) Numerical example for Corollary 5: We let Z = X with probability 1−pe,z and e with probability
pe,z, with pe,z = 0.8. We let Y = X with probability 1 − pe,y and e with probability pe,y, with
pe,y = 0.9. The R.D.I. region under log-loss is given by
R ≥ [pe,zpe,y −D]
+,
∆ ≥ max{1− pe,z, 1− pe,z + pe,zpe,y −D −H2(pe,y)},
The optimal information leakage rate-distortion tradeoffs for all three examples are plotted in Fig. 4.
V. RATE-LIMITED HELPER SETTING
In this section, we consider the rate-limited helper setting in Figure 2.
A. General inner bound
Proposition 8: An inner bound to the R.D.I. region for the rate limited helper setting in Figure 2 is
given by
Rh > max{I(Uh;Y |Z), I(Uh;Y |X)},
R > I(X;V,U |Z,Uh),
∆ > I(X;W,U) + I(X;V |Z,Uh, U)
+ I(V,U ;Uh|X,Y ) + I(U ;Uh|X,Y )−RK −R
′
K
12
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Fig. 4: Optimal ∆ and D tradeoff for the numerical examples given for Corollaries 3, 4 and 5. The blue
line with up triangles corresponds to the numerical example for Corollary 3; the black line with squares
corresponds to the numerical example for Corollary 4, and the red line with down triangles corresponds
to the numerical example for Corollary 5.
for p(uh, u, v, x, y, z, w) and reconstruction function xˆ(Uh, U, V, Z) such that E d(X, xˆ(Uh, U, V, Z)) ≤
D, RK ≤ I(Uh;Y )− I(Uh;X,W,U, V ), R
′
K ≤ Rh−max{I(Uh;Y |Z), I(Uh;Y |X)}, and RK +R′K ≤
I(X;V |Z,Uh, U). In addition, p(uh, u, v, x, y, z, w) obey the Markov relations Uh − Y − (X,Z,W ),
(V,U) − (X,Uh) − (Y,Z,W ) and (V,U,Uh) − (X,Y ) − (W,Z). That is, p(uh, u, v, x, y, z, w) =
p(x, y)p(uh|y)p(v, u|x, uh)p(w, z|x, y).
Proof of this proposition is given in Appendix E. Here, we give an outline of the proof. The proof
follows similar lines to that in Proposition 2, with the encoder sending two layers of descriptions Un and
V n to the decoder. The main differences are in the actions of the helper and how the secret key is being
generated. To reduce R, the helper sends a description Unh to both the encoder and the decoder. To ensure
that both the encoder and the decoder can decode Unh , we require Rh ≥ max{I(Uh;Y |Z), I(Uh;Y |X)}.
The secret key is generated in two parts. The first part of the secret key comes from the codeword
Unh . A secret key of rate RK can be generated by random binning of the Unh codewords if RK ≤
I(Uh;Y ) − I(Uh;X,W,V,U). Next, the helper can also use its own randomness and the remaining
rate (R′K ≤ Rh − max{I(Uh;Y |Z), I(Uh;Y |X)}) to send to the encoder and the decoder a uniform
random variable of size up to 2n(Rh−max{I(Uh;Y |Z),I(Uh;Y |X))} as a second secret key. Hence, R′K ≤
Rh−max{I(Uh;Y |Z), I(Uh;Y |X)}. These two keys are then used to scramble the message sent on the
rate limited link about the second layer of description V n, which is of rate I(X;V |Uh, Z, U), resulting
in the requirement that RK +R′K ≤ I(X;V |Z,Uh, U).
In this achievability scheme, there is a tradeoff between the amount of secret key generated and
the quality of the description that the helper sends to reduce the rate required by the encoder. The
independent randomness sent on the helper link reduces the amount of information leakage through
secret key scrambling, but does not help to reduce the distortion at the decoder. While we can generate
another secret key using the helper codeword, Unh , the rate of the key that can be generated is usually not
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as large as it would be if uniform randomness is used. In some cases such as those in the next subsection,
the tradeoff is tight.
B. R.D.I. regions for discrete memoryless source and S.I.s
We now consider some special cases in which the achievability scheme in Proposition 8 is optimal.
Proposition 9: For the setting in Figure 2, if Y −X − Z −W and the distortion measure is log-loss
distortion (see definition in Corollary 2), then the R.D.I. region is given by
Rh ≥ I(Uh;Y |Z),
R ≥ [H(X|Uh, Z)−D]
+,
∆ ≥ max{I(X;W ), I(X;W ) +H(X|Z)−D −Rh}
for p(uh|y)p(x, z, w|y), with |Uh| ≤ |Y|+ 2.
This result generalizes some of the results found in [2]. By setting W = ∅ and D = 01, we recover [2,
Theorem 4] and by setting Z = ∅ as well, we recover [2, Theorem 2].
Proof: Achievability of the R.D.I. region in Proposition 9 for D ≤ H(X|Uh, Z) follows from
Proposition 8 by setting U = ∅, V to be the following random variable
V =
{
X with probability 1− DH(X|Uh,Z)
∅ otherwise
.
The reconstruction function is given by xˆ(uh, v, z) := p(x|uh, v, z) and it can be verified that this
reconstruction function achieves E d(X, Xˆ) = H(X|Uh, V, Z) = D.
Next, we note now that the definition of V results in the Markov Chain V − X − (Uh, Y, Z,W ).
Further, since Y −X −Z−W , we have I(Uh;Y |Z) ≥ I(Uh;Y |X). The achievable leakage rate is then
given by
∆ > I(X;W ) +H(X|Z,Uh)−D −RK −R
′
K
for RK ≤ I(Uh;Y ) − I(Uh;X), R′K ≤ Rh − I(Uh;Y |Z) and RK +R′K ≤ I(V ;X|Z,Uh). Hence, the
achievable ∆ is either I(X;W ), or I(X;W ) +H(X|Z,Uh) −D − (Rh − I(Uh;X|Z)) = I(X;W ) +
H(X|Z)−D −Rh if Rh − I(Uh;X|Z) < H(X|Z,Uh)−D.
For the proof of the converse, the identification of the auxiliary random variable Uh and lower bounds
for the rates R and Rh follow steps similar to those in [18]. Further, we will use the following lemma
for log-loss found in [17].
Lemma 1: Suppose E d(Xn, Xˆn) ≤ D under log-loss. Then,
H(Xn|Zn,M,Mh) ≤ nD.
Given an (n, 2nR, 2nRh) code that achieves (D+ ǫn,∆+ ǫn), define Uh,i := (Mh,Xi−1, Zi−1, Zni+1).
Note that Uh,i − Yi − (Xi, Zi,Wi) form a Markov Chain. We have
nRh ≥ H(Mh)
≥ I(Y n;Mh|Z
n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Mh|Z
n, Y i−1)
1See Remark 3.5 and Proposition 13
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=n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Mh|Z
n, Y i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Mh, Z
i−1, Zni+1, Y
i−1|Zi)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Mh, Z
i−1, Zni+1,X
i−1, Y i−1|Zi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Uh,i|Zi).
(a) follows from the Markov chain Xi−1 − (Y i−1, Zn,Mh) − Yi, which can be readily shown using
techniques in [18].
nR ≥ H(M)
≥ I(Xn;M |Zn,Mh)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M |X
i−1, Zn,Mh)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Uh,i, Zi)−H(X
n|Zn,Mh,M)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Uh,i, Zi)− nD − nǫn.
The last step follows from an application of Lemma 1.
For the information leakage term, we have
n∆+ nRh + ǫn = I(X
n;M,W n) +H(Mh)
= I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M |W n) +H(Mh)
(a)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M |Zn) +H(Mh)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)− I(Xn;Mh|M,Z
n) +H(Mh|M,Z
n)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n). (3)
(a) follows from the Markov Chain assumption Y n −Xn − Zn −W n; i.e.
I(Xn;M |W n) = I(Zn,Xn;M |W n)− I(Zn;M |Xn,W n)
= I(Zn;M |W n) + I(Xn;M |Zn,W n)
≥ I(Xn;M |Zn)− I(Xn;W n|Zn)
= I(Xn;M |Zn).
Now, we use Lemma 1 again on the term H(Xn|M,Mh, Zn) to obtain H(Xn|M,Mh, Zn) ≤ nD−nǫn.
Hence,
n∆+ nRh ≥
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Wi) +H(Xi|Zi))− nD − 2nǫn.
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The lower bound n∆ ≥
∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Wi) is easy to show.
Now, define Q ∼ U [1 : n] independent of all other random variables, and Uh = (Q,Uh,Q), XQ = X,
YQ = Y , ZQ = Z and WQ = W . It is straightforward to verify that Uh−Y − (X,Z,W ) form a Markov
Chain. Noting that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞, we arrive at the required bound stated in the Proposition. The
cardinality bound on Uh follows from standard techniques [15, Appendix C].
The next result presents another case in which Proposition 8 is optimal under a different Markov Chain
condition, and for a class of distortion measures that include log-loss.
Proposition 10: For the setting in Figure 2, if Y −W − Z −X and RSI−Enc(Z) = RWZ(Z), then
the R.D.I. region is given by
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥ RSI−Enc(D),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;W ), I(X;W ) +RSI−Enc(D)−Rh}.
Here, RSI−Enc(D) = minp(xˆ|x,z):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D I(X; Xˆ |Z).
Proof of this proposition is given in Appendix G. In this setting, side information at the decoder is of
higher quality than the side information at the encoder. Since we assume that RWZ = R(SI − Enc),
any side information sent by the helper does not help to reduce the rate required to achieve a required
distortion at the decoder. The helper’s only role is to generate a secret key to reduce the information
leakage rate. Hence, in this case, there is no tradeoff in the role of the helper between sending a higher
quality description versus sending a secret key to reduce the information leakage rate.
Remark 5.1: It may be of interest to note that the achievability scheme in this proposition relies on a
helper with enough independent randomness to generate a secret key of size 2nRh . The side information
Y n is completely ignored. If, however, the helper is stochastically constrained, in the sense of [19], then
Y n may be used to generate an additional secret key. A complete characterization of the R.D.I. region for
the case of a stochastically constrained helper is, however, an open question to the best of our knowledge.
Using Proposition 10, we have the following two examples for erased side information and Hamming
distortion, and log-loss distortion.
Corollary 6: For the setting in Figure 2, if Y −W − Z − X, Z = X with probability 1 − pe and
Z = e with probability pe and the distortion measure is Hamming distortion, then the R.D.I. region is
given by
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥ peI(X; Xˆ),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;W ), I(X;W ) + peI(X; Xˆ)−Rh},
for p(xˆ|x) satisfying E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D/pe.
Proof: The proof follows straightforwardly from Proposition 10. The fact that RSI−Enc(Z) =
RWZ(Z) and RSI−Enc(D) = minp(xˆ|x):E d(X,Xˆ)≤D/pe peI(X; Xˆ) follow from [16].
Corollary 7: For the setting in Figure 2, if Y −W − Z −X and the distortion measure is log-loss
distortion (see definition in Corollary 2), then the R.D.I. region is given by
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥ [H(X|Z)−D]+ ,
∆ ≥ max{I(X;W ), I(X;W ) +H(X|Z)−D −Rh}.
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Proof: The proof again follows straightforwardly from Proposition 10. The fact that RSI−Enc(Z) =
RWZ(Z) and RSI−Enc(D) = H(X|Z)−D follows from [10].
C. Quadratic Gaussian setting
Following the approach in [20] (see also [18]), we can extend this setting and analysis to the Quadratic
Gaussian case. In this subsection, we consider the sources as zero mean Gaussian sources satisfying the
Markov Chain assumption, and the distortion measure is given by the squared distortion measure.
In a close analog to the case of Proposition 9 for log-loss, we have the following result for the Quadratic
Gaussian setting.
Proposition 11: For the setting in Figure 2, let W ∼ N(0, σ2W ), Z = W + A, X = Z + B and
Y = X + C , where A ∼ N(0, σ2A), A ∼ N(0, σ2B) and C ∼ N(0, σ2C ) are mutually independent. To
avoid degenerate cases, we assume that σ2W , σ2A, σ2B , σ2C > 0. Let the distortion measure be the squared
distortion d(x, xˆ) := (x− xˆ)2. Then, for fixed Rh and D, the R.D.I. region is given by
R ≥

1
2
log

σ2B
(
1− σ
2
B
σ2
B
+σ2
C
(1− 2−2Rh)
)
D




+
,
∆ ≥ max
{
1
2
log
σ2W + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
,
1
2
log
σ2W + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
+
1
2
log
σ2B
22RhD
}
.
Proof: We begin with the converse. For any sequence of (n, 2nR, 2nRh) code that achieves distortion
D, the minimum rate required in the absence of any information leakage constraint is lower bounded
by [18, Corollary 12]
R ≥
1
2
log

σ2B
(
1− σ
2
B
σ2
B
+σ2
C
(1− 2−2Rh)
)
D

 . (4)
On the other hand, consider now a sequence of (n, 2nR, 2nRh) codes that achieves (D,∆). For an
(n, 2nR, 2nRh) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆+ ǫn), we have the straightforward bound of
∆+ ǫn ≥ I(X
n;W n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Wi)
=
n
2
log
σ2W + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
.
We also have, following the same arguments as in the converse proof for Proposition 9 (see inequality (3)),
n∆+ nRh + nǫn ≥ I(X
n;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n).
We now further lower bound this term by
n∆+ nRh + nǫ
(a)
≥ I(Xn;W n) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,Mh, Z
n
i+1, Z
i−1,Xi−1|Zi)
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(b)
= I(Xn;W n) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,Mh, Z
n
i+1, Z
i−1, Xˆi|Zi)
≥ I(Xn;W n) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Xˆi|Zi)
(c)
= nI(X;W ) + nI(X; Xˆ |Z,Q)
≥ nI(X;W ) + nI(X; Xˆ |Z)
≥ nI(X;W ) + nh(X|Z)− nh(X − Xˆ)
≥ nI(X;W ) + n
1
2
log
σ2B
D + ǫn
.
(a) follows from the i.i.d. property of the Xn and Zn; (b) follows from Xˆi being a function of Zn,M,Mh;
and (c) follows from defining Q ∼ U [1 : n],XQ = X, ZQ = Z , XˆQ = Xˆ, YQ = Y and WQ = W .
The final step follows from the distortion constraint: E
∑n
i=1(Xi − Xˆi)
2/n = E(X − Xˆ)2 ≤ D. Hence,
h(X − Xˆ) ≤ 12 log 2πeD + ǫn. Finally, since ǫn → 0 as n→∞, we obtain the following bound on ∆.
∆ ≥ max
{
1
2
log
σ2W + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
,
1
2
log
σ2W + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
+
1
2
log
σ2B
22RhD
}
. (5)
We now turn to the achievability proof for the lower bounds for R and ∆ in inequalities (4) and (5),
respectively. We use Proposition 8 and set U = ∅, Uh = Y +Nh and V = X+Ne, where Nh ∼ N(0, σ2h)
and Ne ∼ N(0, σ2e ) are independent Gaussian random variables. These definitions result in the Markov
Chain V − X − (Uh, Y, Z,W ). We set Xˆ = E(X|Uh, V, Z). It suffices to consider only the case of
D ≤ σ2B
(
1− σ
2
B
σ2
B
+σ2
C
(1− 2−2Rh)
)
. Let
σ2h =
σ2B + σ
2
C
22Rh − 1
,
σ2X|Uh,Z = σ
2
B
(
1−
σ2B
σ2B + σ
2
C
(1− 2−2Rh)
)
,
σ2e =
σ2X|Uh,ZD
σ2X|Uh,Z −D
With these definitions, we have the following quantities.
Var(X|Uh, Z, V ) = E(X − E(X|Uh, Z, V ))
2
= E(B − E(B|B + C +Nh, B +Ne))
2
= D,
Var(X|Uh, Z) = σ
2
X|Uh,Z
,
I(Y ;Uh|Z) = Rh,
h(X|Uh, Z) =
1
2
log 2πeσ2X|Uh,Z ,
h(X|Uh, V, Z) =
1
2
log 2πeD.
It is now straightforward to verify that the achievability scheme in Proposition 8 achieves the outer
bound with these choice of auxiliary random variables, which completes the proof.
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Similarly, in a close analog to Corollary 7, we have the following R.D.I. characterization for another
Quadratic Gaussian setting.
Proposition 12: For the setting in Figure 2, let X ∼ N(0, σ2X ), Z = X + A, W = Z + B, Y =
W + C , and A ∼ N(0, σ2A), B ∼ N(0, σ2B) and C ∼ N(0, σ2C) be mutually independent Gaussian
random variables, and the distortion measure be squared loss. To avoid degenerate cases, we assume that
σ2X , σ
2
A, σ
2
B , σ
2
C > 0. Then, the R.D.I. region is given by
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥
[
1
2
log
(
σ2Xσ
2
A
(σ2X + σ
2
A)D
)]+
,
∆ ≥ max{
1
2
log
(
σ2X + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
,
1
2
log
(
σ2X + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
+
1
2
log
(
σ2Xσ
2
A
(σ2X + σ
2
A)D
)
−Rh}.
Proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix H.
VI. AMPLIFICATION MEASURES
We now turn our attention to source amplification measures at the decoder. Instead of symbol by
symbol distortion measures like those considered in the previous sections, we consider the following two
amplification measures. Let Undec be the overall information at the decoder, which includes the decoder’s
S.I. and the message(s) received.
• List constraint: Based on the decoder’s information, it forms a list, L(Undec), of xn sequences such
that |L(Undec)| ≤ 2nD and P(Xn ∈ L(Undec))→ 1 as n→∞. The list constraint is a straightforward
generalization of lossless source coding, with D = 0 corresponding to the lossless case.
• Entropy constraint: Here, we wish to ensure that lim supn→∞ 1nH(X
n|Undec) ≤ D. The entropy
constraint can be shown to be equivalent to block log-loss constraint [12]. That is, the decoder’s
reconstruction vector is the set of all probability distributions over |X |n, and the distortion is
measured by log(1/xˆ(xn))/n, where xˆ(xn) is the estimated probability of Xn = xn. Block log-loss
is a strengthening of the symbol-by-symbol log-loss distortion measure defined in Corollary 2 since
it allows more general probability distributions over |X |n instead of only product distributions (in
the case of symbol by symbol log loss).
We now consider how the R.D.I. regions change when we replace log-loss distortion constraint with
the amplification measures.
Proposition 13: For the settings in Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, and Proposition 9, the R.D.I. regions remain
unchanged if the log-loss distortion measure at the decoder is replaced by a list or entropy constraint.
For the case of entropy constraint (or block log-loss), Proposition 13 states that even if we allow more
general probability distributions than the product distributions for symbol-by-symbol log-loss, there is no
gain in the R.D.I. regions for our settings. In the case of list constraint, it relates achievable distortion
under log-loss to the exponent of the achievable list size, and also provides a way of recovering results
for lossless source coding from results for log-loss distortion measure with D set to zero.
Proof:
In our proof, we will use the following lemma found in [14], adapted to our notation.
Lemma 2: Let L(Undec) be a sequence of list decoders such that P(Xn /∈ L(Undec)) → 0 as n→∞.
Then,
H(Xn|Undec) ≤ log |L(U
n
dec)|+ nǫn,
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞.
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Achievability under list decoding
We now show the achievability of Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, and Proposition 9, when the log-loss constraint
at the decoder is replaced by a list constraint, with log |L(Undec)| ≤ nD. Let V ndec denote all the codewords
decoded and the original side information at the decoder for Corollary 2 and Propositions 3 and 4. In
the achievability scheme of Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, and Proposition 9, recall that our scheme results in
P((V ndec,X
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞. The list decoder forms the following list:
L(vndec) := {x
n : (xn, vndec) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ }.
From properties of typical sequences (see [15, Chapter 2]), we have that
1
n
log |L(vndec)| ≤ H(X|Vdec) + δ(ǫ)
= D + δ(ǫ).
The last step follows from the choice of auxiliary random variables in Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, and
Proposition 9. The requirement that P(Xn ∈ L(V ndec)) → 1 as n → ∞ follows from P((V ndec,Xn) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞ in our achievability scheme.
Achievability under entropy constraint
Achievability under entropy constraint is a straightforward consequence of achievability under list
constraint and Lemma 2. Since we have a sequence of list decoders satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2,
1
n
H(Xn|V ndec) ≤
1
n
log |L(V ndec)|+ ǫn
≤ D + δ(ǫ) + ǫn.
Converse
From Lemma 2, any code under list constraint that achieves a list size of Dlist is also a code that
achieves a block log-loss (or entropy constraint) of at most Dlist − ǫn. Hence, any outer bound for
our settings under entropy constraint is also an outer bound for our settings under the list constraint. We
therefore only need to consider outer bounds for our settings under the entropy constraint in the converse.
With the above observation, recall that in our proof of converse for Proposition 9, a key property of
log-loss that we used is the fact that log-loss distortion upper bounds the entropy of the source sequence
given the overall side information at the decoder (see Lemma 1). Similar to log-loss, given a code with
entropy constraint of Dentropy, we have, by definition, the following upper bound on the entropy of the
source sequence given the overall side information at the decoder.
1
n
H(Xn|Undec) ≤ Dentropy. (6)
It can be verified that our converse proof for Proposition 9 continues to hold under the entropy constraint
with the upper bound in Lemma 1, 1nH(X
n|Undec) ≤ Dlog−loss, being replaced by inequality (6). For
Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, the upper bound 1nH(X
n|Undec) ≤ Dlog−loss was used implicitly in the proofs of
converse, and similarly, it can be verified that the proof of converse continues to hold with inequality (6)
for the entropy constraint case. The details are given in Appendix I.
Remark 6.1: The property RSI−Enc(Y˜ ) = RWZ(Y˜ ) enjoyed by the log-loss distortion measure was
used to obtain the R.D.I. regions under log-loss for Corollaries 2, 5 and 7. Using inequality (6) and
Lemma 1, we can show that the same property also holds true under block log-loss or list constraint.
This property can also be used to give proofs of converse for Corollaries 2, 5 and 7, similar to what was
done in the log-loss case.
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VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the setting of secure lossy source coding when either coded or uncoded S.I. is available
at the decoder. For the case of uncoded side information, we considered two related settings. Our first
setting considered the case where the eavesdropper’s S.I. is not available at the decoder. We gave general
inner and outer bounds for this setup, and characterized the R.D.I. region for some special cases. We then
considered the second uncoded S.I. setting where the eavesdropper’s S.I. is also available to the decoder.
For this case, we again give general inner and outer bounds for this setting and characterized the R.D.I.
region for some special cases. The main idea used in the achievability proofs for these settings is in the
generation of a secret key, via binning the S.I. at the encoder and the decoder, to reduce the information
leakage rate at the eavesdropper. This idea can also be used in other secure source coding settings [21].
A recurring theme in the special cases for which we were able to find the R.D.I. regions is that the
source, S.I.s and distortion measure satisfy the condition that S.I. at the encoder does not improve the
rate-distortion region.
We then considered the case of coded S.I. at the encoder and decoder. For this case, we gave an
achievability scheme for the general setting that used the idea of generating a secret key from the coded
S.I., as well as the helper generating an independent secret key for both the encoder and the decoder.
We characterized the R.D.I. regions for several settings and recovered previous results in the literature
as special cases of our settings. Finally, we considered two amplification measures for the decoder, list-
decoding and entropy minimization, and showed that the R.D.I. regions under these measures coincide
with the R.D.I. region under per symbol log-loss for the cases we considered in this paper.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Given a (n, 2nR) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆ + ǫn), define the auxiliary random variables Ui :=
(M,Y i−1, Zni+1) and Vi = (Y ni+1,Xni+1) for i ∈ [1 : n]. A lower bound on the rate is then given by
nR ≥ H(M)
≥ I(Xn;M |Y n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M |Y
n,Xni+1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,X
n
i+1, Y
n
i+1, Y
i−1|Yi)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,X
n
i+1, Y
n
i+1, Y
i−1, Zni+1|Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ui, Vi|Yi).
The last step follows from the definition of Uiand Vi. (a) follows from (Xn, Y n) being generated i.i.d.
and (b) follows from the Markov Chain Zni+1 − (M,Xni+1, Y ni+1, Y i)−Xi. For the information leakage
term, we have
n∆+ ǫn = I(X
n;M,Zn)
= I(Xn, Y n;M,Zn)− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(Xn, Y n;Zn) + I(Xn, Y n;M |Zn)− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(Xn, Y n;Zn) + I(Xn, Y n;M)− I(M ;Zn)− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) + I(X
n;M |Y n) + I(M ;Y n)− I(M ;Zn)− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) + I(X
n;M |Y n) +
n∑
i=1
(I(M,Y i−1, Zni+1;Yi)− I(M,Y
i−1, Zni+1;Zi))
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− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) + I(X
n;M |Y n) +
n∑
i=1
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Zi))− I(Y
n;M,Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M |Y
n,Xni+1) +
n∑
i=1
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Zi))
− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,Y
i−1, Y ni+1,X
n
i+1|Yi) +
n∑
i=1
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Zi))
− I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Zi) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,Y
i−1, Y ni+1,X
n
i+1, Z
n
i+1|Yi)
+
n∑
i=1
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Zi))− I(Y
n;M,Zn|Xn).
(a) follows from the Csisza´r Sum lemma. The lower bound
∆+ ǫn ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi)
is straightforward to show.
Now, let Q ∼ U [1 : n] be the time-sharing random variable that is independent of all other random
variables. Define U = (Q,M,Y Q−1, ZnQ+1), V = (Y nQ+1,XnQ+1) and (XQ, YQ, ZQ) = (X,Y,Z). Then,
R ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ui, Vi|Yi, Q = i)
= I(X;UQ, V |Y,Q)
= I(X;U, V |Y ).
The last step follows from the fact that (Xn, Y n) is i.i.d. and hence, I(X;Q|Y ) = 0. Next,
∆+ ǫn ≥ I(X,Y ;Z|Q) + I(X;UQ, V |Y,Q) + I(UQ;Y |Q)− nI(UQ;Z|Q)−
1
n
I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(X,Y ;Z) + I(X;U, V |Y ) + I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)−
1
n
I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(X,Y ;Z) + I(X,Y ;U, V )− I(Y ;U, V ) + I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)−
1
n
I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(X,Y ;Z) + I(X,Y ;U, V |Z) + I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U)−
1
n
I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
= I(X,Y ;U, V, Z) + I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U)−
1
n
I(Y n;M,Zn|Xn)
≥ I(X;U, V, Z) + I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U) + I(Y ;U, V, Z|X) −
1
n
H(Y n|Xn)
= I(X;U, V, Z) + I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U)−H(Y |U, V,X,Z).
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Finally, we consider the bound on distortion. We have
D + ǫn ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
E d(Xi, xˆi(Y
n,M))
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
E d(Xi, xˆ
′
i(Ui, Vi, Yi))
= EQ E(d(XQ, xˆ
′
Q(UQ, VQ, YQ))|Q)
= E d(X, xˆ′(U, V, Y )).
Hence, the choice of auxiliary random variables satisfy the distortion constraint with reconstruction
function xˆ′. Next, noting that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ then gives us the required bound. The Markov Chain
condition (U, V ) − (X,Y ) − Z follows from the definition of the auxiliary random variables and is
straightforward to verify.
It remains to give upper bounds on the cardinalities of U and V . The stated bounds follow straight-
forwardly from the cardinality bounding techniques in [15, Appendix C] and we omit them here.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We give a proof of the lower bound, with details for the fairly standard decoding steps left out of the
proof. In our proof, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Fix ǫ > 0. Let Y n ∼
∏n
i=1 p(yi) and let W n be a random variable such that
P((Y n,W n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (Y,W ))→ 1 as n→∞. Bin the set of all |Y|n sequences to 2nRK bins uniformly
at random, and let K be the bin index such that Y n ∈ B(K). Then, if RK ≤ H(Y |W ),
H(Y n|W n,K) ≤ nH(Y |W )− nRK + nδ(ǫ).
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C. We note here that the special case of RK = 0 will be used
several times in the proofs of this proposition and Proposition 8.
Codebook generation
We generate two codebooks, the rate-distortion codebook and the key generation codebook. We first
start with the rate distortion codebook, CRD.
• Generate 2n(I(U ;X,Y )+δ(ǫ)) Un(l0) sequences according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui), l0 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(U ;X,Y )+δ(ǫ))].
• For each un(l0) sequence, generate 2n(I(V ;X,Y |U)+δ(ǫ)) V n(l1, l0) sequences according to∏n
i=1 p(vi|ui), l1 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(V ;X,Y |U)+δ(ǫ))].
• Partition the set of Un sequences to 2n(I(U ;X|Y )+3δ(ǫ)) bins, BRD(m0), m0 ∈ [1 : 2n(I(U ;X|Y )+3δ(ǫ))].
• For each l0, partition the set of V n sequences to 2n(I(V ;X|Y,U)+3δ(ǫ)) bins, BRD(m1, l0),
m1 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(V ;X|Y,U)+3δ(ǫ))].
This completes the codebook generation for CRD. We now turn to the key generation codebook, CK,
which has only a single step. We assume that min{I(V ;X|Y,U),H(Y |X,Z,U, V )} > 0. Otherwise, no
binning is done.
• Randomly and uniformly bin the set of Y n sequences to 2nRK bins, BK(mk), where
RK := min{H(Y |U, V,X,Z), I(V ;X|U, Y )} and mk ∈ [1 : 2nRK ].
We use C := {CRD, CK} to denote the combined codebook.
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Encoding
• Given sequences (xn, yn), the encoder first looks for a sequence un(l0) such that (un(l0), xn, yn) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ . If there is more than one such sequence, the encoder selects one sequence uniformly at
randomly from the set of jointly typical un sequences. If there is none, the encoder randomly and
uniformly selects a sequence un from the set of all sequences.
• Next, the encdoer looks for a vn(l1, l0) such that (vn(l1, l0), un(l0), xn, yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ . If there is more
than one such sequence, the encoder selects one sequence uniformly at random from the set of jointly
typical vn sequences. If there is none, the encoder randomly and uniformly selects a sequence vn
from the set of all sequences.
• The encoder then looks for the index m0 and m1 such that un(l0) ∈ BRD(m0) and vn(l1, l0) ∈
BRD(m1, l0).
• Next, it splits the index m1 into two parts, m1s ∈ [1 : 2nRK ] and m1o ∈ [1 : 2n(I(V ;X|U,Y )+3δ(ǫ)−RK )].
• The encoder then looks for the index mk such that yn ∈ BK(mk).
• Finally, the encoder sends out the indices m0, m1o and m1s ⊕mk2, resulting in a rate of
I(X;U, V |Y ) + 6δ(ǫ).
Analysis of distortion
Since the decoder has the sequence yn, it first finds mk to unscramble m1s ⊕mk, thereby recovering
the index m1. It then decodes the codewords un(L0) and vn(L0, L1) using successive decoding. That is,
it first looks for a lˆ0 such that (un(lˆ0), yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ and un(lˆ0) ∈ B(m0). An error occurs if there is no
such lˆ0. Next, it then looks for a lˆ1 such that (vn(lˆ1, lˆ0), un(lˆ0), yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ and vn(lˆ0, lˆ1) ∈ B(m1, lˆ0).
Similarly, an error occurs if there is no such lˆ1. The analysis of the probability of error follows quite
straightforwardly from the analysis for the Wyner-Ziv setting in [15, Chapter 11], and we will omit it
here. From the rates given in the codebook generation and encoding process, it can be shown that the
probability of error (lˆ0 6= L0 or lˆ1 6= L1), averaged over codebooks, goes to zero as n→∞.
Further, from the rates given and the covering lemma in [15, Chapter 3], we have that
P((Un(L0), V
n(L0, L1),X
n, Y n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ ) → 1 as n → ∞. Hence, following [15, Chapter 3], the
expected distortion, averaged over codebooks, is less than or equal to D + δ(ǫ) as n→∞.
Analysis of information leakage rate
For notational convenience, we will use δ(ǫ) to denote all terms that go to zero as ǫ→ 0, or n→∞.
n∆ = I(Xn;Zn,M0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |C)
≤ I(Xn;Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |C)
= I(Xn, Y n;Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |C)− I(Y
n;Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |X
n, C). (7)
We now bound each of the terms separately.
I(Xn, Y n;Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |C)
= H(Zn, L0|C) +H(M1o,M1s ⊕MK |L0, Z
n, C)−H(Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |X
n, Y n, C)
≤ H(Zn, L0|C) +H(M1o,M1s ⊕MK |L0, C)−H(Z
n|Xn, Y n, C)
≤ H(L0|C) +H(Z
n|L0, C) + nI(V ;X|U, Y )− nH(Z|X,Y ) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ H(L0|C) +H(Z
n|Un(L0)) + nI(V ;X|U, Y )− nH(Z|X,Y ) + nδ(ǫ)
2Here, m1s ⊕mk denotes the modulo operation, (m1s +mk)mod 2nRK , with the exception that 0 is mapped to 2nRK .
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(a)
≤ nI(U ;X,Y ) + nǫ+ nH(Z|U) + nI(V ;X|U, Y )− nH(Z|X,Y ) + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(X,Y ;Z,U) + nI(V ;X|U, Y ) + nδ(ǫ). (8)
The final step uses the Markov relation U−(X,Y )−Z . In (a), we applied Lemma 3 to H(Zn|Un(L0)).
The condition that P((Un(L0), Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞ follows from the rates given, the codebook
generation and encoding process, and the conditional typicality lemma and covering lemma in [15]. For
the second term, we have
− I(Y n;Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK |X
n, C)
= −H(Y n|Xn, C) +H(Y n|Xn, Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(Y n, L1|X
n, Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
= −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n, Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C) +H(Y
n|Xn, Zn, L0, L1,Mk, C)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n, Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C) +H(Y
n|Xn, Zn, Un(L0), V
n(L0, L1),Mk)
(a)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n, Zn, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C) + nH(Y |U, V,X,Z) − nRK + nδ(ǫ)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n, Zn, L0, C) + nH(Y |U, V,X,Z) − nRK + nδ(ǫ)
≤ −nH(Y |X) + nI(V ;Y |U,X,Z) + nH(Y |U, V,X,Z) − nRK + nδ(ǫ). (9)
In (a), we apply Lemma 3 to H(Y n|Xn, Zn, Un(L0), V n(L0, L1),Mk). To check that the condi-
tions for applying Lemma 3 are satisfied, observe that RK = min{I(V ;X|Y,U),H(Y |X,Z,U, V )} ≤
H(Y |X,Z,U, V ). The condition that
P((Un(L0), V
n(L0, L1),X
n, Y n, Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 follows again from the rates given and the encoding
process. In the final step, we upper bound H(L1|Xn, Zn, L0, C) as follow.
H(L1|X
n, Zn, L0, C)
= H(L1,X
n, Zn|L0, C)−H(X
n, Zn|L0, C)
= H(L1|L0, C) +H(X
n, Zn|L0, L1, C)−H(X
n, Zn|C) +H(L0|C)−H(L0|X
n, Zn, C)
= H(L1|L0, C) +H(X
n, Zn|L0, L1, C)−H(X
n, Zn|C) +H(L0|C)−H(L0|X
n, Y n, Zn, C)
− I(Y n;L0|X
n, Zn, C)
≤ nI(V ;X,Y |U) +H(Xn, Zn|Un(L0), V
n(L0, L1))− nH(X,Z) + nI(U ;X,Y )
− I(Y n;L0|X
n, Zn, C) + nδ(ǫ)
(a)
≤ nI(V ;X,Y |U) +H(X,Z|U, V )− nH(X,Z) + nI(U ;X,Y )− I(Y n;L0|X
n, Zn, C) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ nI(V ;X,Y |U) +H(X,Z|U, V )− nH(X,Z) + nI(U ;X,Y )−H(Y n|Xn, Zn, C)
+H(Y n|Un(L0),X
n, Zn) + nδ(ǫ)
(b)
≤ nI(V ;X,Y |U) +H(X,Z|U, V )− nH(X,Z) + nI(U ;X,Y )− nH(Y |X,Z) + nH(Y |X,Z,U)
+ nδ(ǫ)
= nI(V ;Y |U,X,Z) + nδ(ǫ).
(a) and (b) follow from applying Lemma 3 to the terms H(Xn, Zn|Un(L0), V n(L0, L1)) and
H(Y n|Un(L0),X
n, Zn) respectively. The final step uses the Markov condition (V,U)− (X,Y )−Z and
hence, I(V,U ;X,Y ) = I(V,U ;X,Y,Z).
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Combining the bounds in (8) and (9) into (7) then leads us to
∆ ≤ I(X,Y ;Z,U) + I(V ;X|U, Y )−H(Y |X) +H(Y |X,Z, V, U) −RK +H(Y |U,X,Z)
−H(Y |X,Z, V, U) − δ(ǫ)
= I(X;Z,U) + I(V ;X|U, Y )−RK .
Hence, any ∆′ > ∆ is achievable.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let ǫ′′ > ǫ′ > ǫ and define N(wn, k) := |{yn : yn ∈ B(k), (yn, wn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′′ }| and E1 = 1 if
N(W n,K) > a and 0 otherwise. Let E2 = 1 if (W n, Y n) /∈ T (n)ǫ and 0 otherwise. Observe that by
assumption, P(E2 = 1)→ 0 as n→∞. We now focus on E1.
P(E1 = 1)
≤
∑
wn∈T (n)
ǫ′
,k
p(wn, k) P(E1 = 1|W
n = wn,K = k) + P(W n /∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ )
≤
∑
wn∈T (n)
ǫ′
,k
p(wn, k) P(E1 = 1|W
n = wn,K = k) + ǫn
=
∑
wn∈T
(n)
ǫ′
,k
p(wn, k) P(N(wn, k) > a|W n = wn,K = k) + ǫn
=
∑
wn∈T (n)
ǫ′
,k
p(wn, k)
∑
y¯n
P(Y n = y¯n|W n = wn,K = k) P(N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n,W n = wn,K = k)
+ ǫn
=
∑
wn∈T
(n)
ǫ′
,k
p(wn, k)
∑
y¯n
P(Y n = y¯n|W n = wn,K = k) P(N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n,K = k) + ǫn.
(10)
The last line follows from the Markov relation (W n = wn) − (Y n = y¯n,K = k) − {N(wn, k) > a},
which follows from the binning of all |Y|n sequences being done uniformly at random, independent of
W n and Y n.
P(N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n,K = k) =
P(K = k,N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n)
P(K = k|Y n = y¯n)
(a)
= 2nRK P(K = k,N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n)
(b)
= 2nRK P(y¯n ∈ B(k), N(wn, k) > a)
(c)
≤ 2nRK2−nRK .
P(|{yn : yn ∈ B(k), yn 6= y¯n, (yn, wn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′′ }| > a− 1)
≤P(N(wn, k) > a− 1).
(a) follows from P(K = k|Y n = y¯n) = 2nRK . (b) and (c) follow from the fact that the sequences
are binned uniformly at random, independent of other sequences. Observe now that EN(wn, k) =
|T
(n)
ǫ′′ (Y |w
n)|2−nRK since the sequences are binned uniformly at random. Using the bound |T (n)ǫ′′ (Y |wn)| ≤
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2n(H(Y |W )+δ1(ǫ
′′)) and applying Markov’s inequality with a−1 = 2n(H(Y |W )−RK+2δ1(ǫ′′)) to P(N(wn, k) >
a− 1), we have
P(N(wn, k) > a|Y n = y¯n,K = k) ≤
1
2nδ1(ǫ′′)
. (11)
Using the bound (11) in (10), we obtain
P(E1 = 1) ≤
1
2nδ1(ǫ
′′)
+ ǫn.
Hence, with a = 2n(H(Y |W )−RK+2δ1(ǫ′′)) + 1 in the definition of E1, we have
H(Y n|W n,K) ≤ H(Y n, E1, E2|W
n,K)
≤ 2 + P(E1 = 0, E2 = 0)H(Y
n|W n, E1 = 0, E2 = 0,K)
+ 2nP(E2 = 1) log |Y|+ nP(E1 = 1) log |Y|
≤ n(H(Y |W )−RK + δ(ǫ))
for n sufficiently large. The final step also uses the assumption that RK ≤ H(Y |W ) and hence, a =
1 + 2n(H(Y |W )−RK+2δ1(ǫ
′′)) ≤ 2n(H(Y |W )−RK+δ2(ǫ
′′)) for n sufficiently large.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Given a (n, 2nR) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆+ ǫn), define the auxiliary random variables
Vi = (M,Y
i−1, Zi−1, Y ni+1, Z
n
i+1) for i ∈ [1 : n]. We have
nR ≥ H(M)
≥ I(Xn;M |Y n, Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M |Y
n, Zn,Xi−1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;M,X
i−1, Y i−1, Zi−1, Y ni+1, Z
n
i+1|Yi, Zi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi|Yi, Zi),
where (a) follows from the fact that the sources are i.i.d.. Next, for the information leakage rate
n∆+ nǫn = I(X
n;M,Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;M |Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;M,Y n|Zn)− I(Xn;Y n|M,Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;Y n|Zn) + I(Xn;M |Y n, Zn)− I(Xn;Y n|M,Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;M |Y n, Zn) + I(Xn;Y n|Zn)− I(M,Xn;Y n|Zn) + I(M ;Y n|Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn;M |Y n, Zn)− I(M ;Y n|Zn,Xn) + I(M ;Y n|Zn)
≥
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Zi) + I(Xi;Vi|Yi, Zi)−H(Yi|Zi,Xi)).
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Next, we let Q ∼ U [1 : n] and define V = (VQ, Q), XQ = X, YQ = Y , ZQ = Z . For the distortion,
we have
D + ǫn ≥
1
n
E
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, xˆi(Z
n, Y n,M))
=
1
n
E
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, xˆi(Vi, Zi, Yi))
= E d(X, xˆ(V,Z, Y )).
Then, noting that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ and using the i.i.d. property of the source and S.I., we obtain
the bounds stated in the proposition. The Markov Chain condition V − (X,Y ) − Z follows from the
definition of V and is easy to verify. The cardinality bound for V follows from standard arguments [15,
Appendix C] and we omit it here.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
We first state the following lemma that we will use in our analysis of information leakage rate in our
proof. The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix F.
Lemma 4: Fix ǫ > 0. Let Un(l), l ∈ [1 : 2nR˜] be generated according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui). Let W˜ n be a
random variable and assume that there exists a random variable L ∈ [1 : 2nR˜] such that P((Un(L), W˜ n) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞. Bin the Un(l) sequences uniformly at random to 2nRK bins, B(k), k ∈ [1 : 2nRK ].
Let K be the index such that Un(L) ∈ B(K). For n sufficiently large, let δ1(ǫ′) be a function of ǫ′,
where ǫ′ > ǫ, such that: δ1(ǫ′) → 0 as ǫ′ → 0; and P((Un(1), w˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ ) ≥ 2−n(I(U ;W˜ )+δ1(ǫ
′)) for
w˜n ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (W˜ )3. Then, for n sufficiently large and R˜− I(U ; W˜ )−RK > δ1(ǫ′),
H(L|K, W˜ n) ≤ n(R˜−RK − I(U ; W˜ ) + δ(ǫ)).
We will also use Lemma 3, stated in Appendix B, in our analysis.
Now, we turn to the achievability proof. We assume in our proof that I(Uh;Y |Z) ≥ I(Uh;Y |X). The
proof when the inequality is reversed follows the same arguments, and is omitted.
Codebook generation
We start with the codebook generation at the helper.
• Generate 2n(I(Uh;Y )+3δ(ǫ)) Unh (lh), lh ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Uh;Y )+3δ(ǫ))] sequences according to
∏n
i=1 p(uh,i).
• Partition the codewords to 2n(I(Uh;Y |Z)+5δ(ǫ)) bins, Bh(mh), mh ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Uh;Y |Z)+5δ(ǫ))].
Next, we turn to the codebook generation at the encoder
• Generate 2n(I(U ;X,Uh)+δ(ǫ)) Un(l0) sequences according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui), l0 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(U ;X,Uh)+δ(ǫ))].
• For each un(l0) sequence, generate 2n(I(V ;X,Uh|U)+δ(ǫ)) V n(l1, l0) sequences according to∏n
i=1 p(vi|ui), l1 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(V ;X,Uh|U)+δ(ǫ))].
• Partition the set of Un sequences to 2n(I(U ;X|Uh,Z)+2δ(ǫ)) bins, BRD(m0),
m0 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(U ;X|Uh,Z)+2δ(ǫ))].
• For each l0, partition the set of V n sequences to 2n(I(V ;X|Uh,U,Z)+2δ(ǫ)) bins, BRD(m1, l0),
m1 ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(V ;X|Uh,Z,U)+2δ(ǫ))].
3The existence of δ1(ǫ′) for n sufficiently large follows from the conditional typical lemma [15, Chapter 2]
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We now turn to the key generation codebook, CK, which has only a single step. We assume that I(Uh;Y )−
I(Uh;X,W,V,U) > 0. Otherwise, the Unh (l) codewords are not used to generate a secret key.
• Randomly and uniformly bin the set of Unh (l) sequences to 2nRK bins, BK(mk), mk ∈ [1 : 2nRK ]
and RK ≤ I(Uh;Y )− I(Uh;X,W,V,U) + δ(ǫ).
We use C := {CRD, CK} to denote the combined codebook.
Encoding
Encoding at the helper.
• Given sequence yn, the helper looks for a codeword unh(lh) such that (un(lh), yn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ . If there
is more than one such codeword, it selects a codeword uniformly at random from the set of all
jointly typical codewords. If there is none, it selects an index uniformly at random from the set of
all possible indices.
• Note that we have P((Unh (Lh), Y n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞. Further, from the conditional typicality
lemma [15, Chapter 2] and the Markov relation Uh − Y − (X,Z,W ), we have
P((Unh (Lh), Y
n,Xn, Zn,W n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ )→ 1 as n→∞.
• The helper finds mh such that unh(lh) ∈ B(mh).
• Next, using its own independent randomness, the helper generates an additional key m′k uniformly
distributed over the set [1 : 2nR′K ].
• The helper sends out mh and m′k, resulting in a rate that is less than or equal Rh.
Decoding helper’s message at the encoder
The encoder first decodes the helper’s message. That is, it looks for the unique unh(lˆh) such that
(un(lˆnh), x
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ and un(lˆh) ∈ B(mh). Following standard analysis and the rates given for mh and
lh, the probability of error in decoding lh goes to zero as n→∞ since I(Uh;Y |X) ≤ I(Uh;Y |Z).
Encoding at the encoder
• Given sequences (xn, unh(lˆh)), the encoder first looks for a sequence un(l0) such that
(un(l0), x
n, unh(lˆh)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ . If there is more than one such sequence, the encoder selects one
sequence uniformly at randomly from the set of jointly typical un sequences. If there is none, the
encoder randomly and uniformly selects a sequence un from the set of all sequences.
• Next, the encoder looks for a vn(l1, l0) such that (vn(l1, l0), un(l0), xn, unh(lˆh)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ . If there
is more than one such sequence, the encoder selects one sequence uniformly at random from the
set of jointly typical vn sequences. If there is none, the encoder randomly and uniformly selects a
sequence vn from the set of all sequences.
• The encoder then looks for the index m0 and m1 such that un(l0) ∈ B(m0) and vn(l1, l0) ∈
B(m1, l0).
• Next, it splits the index m1 into three parts, m1s ∈ [1 : 2nRK ], m′1s ∈ [1 : 2nR
′
K ] and
m1o ∈ [1 : 2
n(I(V ;X|U,Y )+2δ(ǫ)−RK−R′K)].
• The encoder then looks for the index mk such that yn ∈ BK(mk).
• Finally, the encoder sends out the indices m0, m1o, m1s ⊕mk and m′1s ⊕m′k, resulting in a rate
of I(X;U, V |Y )+ 4δ(ǫ). Note here that the constraints on RK and R′K guarantee the feasibility of
the secret key scrambling operations (m1s ⊕mk and m′1s ⊕m′k).
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Probability of error in encoding
In our achievability scheme, we require that P((Unh (Lˆh), Un(L0), V n(L0, L1),Xn, Y n, Zn,W n) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ ) → 1 as n → ∞. Let E1 denote the event (Unh (Lˆh), Un(L0), V n(L0, L1),Xn, Y n, Zn,W n) /∈
T
(n)
ǫ . Therefore, P(E1) denotes the probability of overall encoder error. Let E0 denote the event that
{(Unh (Lh), U
n(L0),X
n, Y n, Zn,W n) /∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ } ∪ {Lˆh 6= Lh}. We know from the preceding analysis that
P(E0) → 0 as n → ∞ since P(Lˆh 6= Lh) → 0 and P((Unh (Lh), Y n,Xn, Zn,W n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ ) → 1 as
n → ∞. To show that P(E1) → 0 as n → ∞, it remains to show that P(Ec0 ∩ E1) → 0 as n → ∞. To
do so, we will use the Markov lemma in [15, Chapter 12] stated as follow.
Lemma 5 (Markov Lemma): Suppose X˜ → Y˜ → Z˜. Let (x˜n, y˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ and Z˜n ∼ p(z˜n|y˜n), where
the conditional pmf p(z˜n|y˜n) satisfies the following conditions
1) P((y˜n, Z˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ )→ 1 as n→∞;
2) for every z˜n ∈ T (n)ǫ′ (Z˜|y˜n) and n sufficiently large
2−n(H(Z˜ |Y˜ )+δ(ǫ
′)) ≤ p(z˜n|y˜n) ≤ 2−n(H(Z˜|Y˜ )−δ(ǫ
′)).
Then, if ǫ′ is sufficiently small compared to ǫ, P((x˜n, y˜n, Z˜n) /∈ T (n)ǫ )→ 0 as n→∞.
Next, let (X˜n, Y˜ n) = (Unh (Lh), Y n,Xn, Zn,W n), Y˜ n = (Unh (Lh),Xn) and
Z˜n = (V n(L0, L1), U
n(L0)), we have
P(E1 ∩ E
c
0) ≤ P(E1|E
c
0)
=
∑
(y˜n,x˜n)∈T (n)
ǫ′
P((x˜n, y˜n)|En0 ) P(E1|(x˜
n, y˜n)).
Consider now the term P(E1|(x˜n, y˜n)) = P((V n(L0, L1), Un(L0), x˜n, y˜n) /∈ T (n)ǫ ). Observe from the
encoding process that (V n(L0, L1), Un(L0)) → Y˜ n → X˜n. Hence, we now apply the Markov lemma
to show that P((V n(L0, L1), Un(L0), x˜n, y˜n) /∈ T (n)ǫ ) → 0 for every (x˜n, y˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ . Condition 1 of
the Markov lemma holds since from the rates given, codebook generation process, encoding process and
standard analysis using the covering lemma of [15, Chapter 3], P(((V n(L0, L1), Un(L0), y˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ )→
1 as n → ∞. Next, we check that the second condition holds. The analysis closely follows that used
in [15, Chapter 12, Lemma 12.3], and we omit the details here.
P(V n(L0, L1) = v
n, Un(L0, L1) = u
n|y˜n) = P(Un(L0) = u
n|unh, x
n) P(V n(L0, L1) = v
n|un, unh, x
n)
(a).
= 2−nH(U |X,Uh) P(V n(L0, L1) = v
n|un, unh, x
n)
(b).
= 2−nH(U |X,Uh)2−nH(V |U,X,Uh)
.
= 2−nH(U,V |X,Uh).
(a) follows the same analysis as in [15, Chapter 12, Lemma 12.3]. (b) also follows from an analysis
similar to that in [15, Chapter 12, Lemma 12.3], but conditioned on Un(L0) = un.
Hence, P(E1|(x˜n, y˜n))→ 0 as n→∞ and therefore, P(E1|Ec0)→ 0 as n→∞. We note here that our
analysis also implies that P((Unh (Lh), Un(L0), V n(L0, L1),Xn, Y n, Zn,W n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ ) → 1 as n → ∞.
This fact will be used in our analysis of information leakage rate.
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Decoding and analysis of distortion
• The decoder first decodes the codeword from the helper by looking for an unique unh(lˆh) such that
(unh(lˆh), z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ , and unh(lˆh) ∈ Bh(mh). The probability of error in this step goes to zero with
n since Rh > I(Uh;Y |Z).
• The decoder next looks for the mˆk such that unh(lˆh) ∈ BK(mˆk).
• It then unscrambles the indices m1s and m′1s by unscrambling m1s ⊕mk and m′1s ⊕m′k using mˆk
and m′k respectively.
• Finally, the decoder decodes the codewords un(L0) and vn(L0, L1) using the indices m0 and m1
by successive decoding (see decoding and analysis of probability of error in proof of Proposition 2).
The analysis of the probability of error follows quite straightforwardly from the analysis for a similar
setting in [18], and we will omit it here. Finally, for the distortion constraint, similar to the proof
in Proposition 2, we note that since the probability of encoding error or decoding error goes to zero
as n → ∞, the expected distortion, averaged over codebooks, is less than or equal to D + δ(ǫ) as
n→∞ [15, Chapter 3].
Analysis of information leakage rate
For notational convenience, we will use δ(ǫ) to denote all terms that go to zero as ǫ→ 0, or n→∞. We
will also suppress the indices for the codewords. Hence, Unh (Lh) = Unh , Un(L0) = Un and V n(L0, L1) =
V n. Note also that in our analysis, the manipulation of mutual information and entropy quantities will use
the three Markov relations: MC1: Uh − Y − (X,Z,W ), MC2: (V,U)− (X,Uh)− (Y,Z,W ) and MC3:
(V,U,Uh) − (X,Y ) − (W,Z) ) stated in the Proposition. For brevity, we will not state these relations
explicitly in the analysis, but indicate by the labels (MC1, MC2, MC3) whether MC1, MC2 or MC3 is
used in the steps in the analysis.
n∆ = I(Xn;W n,M0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |C)
≤ I(Xn;W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |C)
= I(Xn, Y n;W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |C)
− I(Y n;W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |X
n, C). (12)
Similar to Proposition 2, we analyze the two terms in (12) separately. For the first term, an additional
term comes up due to independent randomness.
I(Xn, Y n;W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |C)
= H(W n, L0|C) +H(M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |L0,W
n, C)
−H(W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |X
n, Y n, C)
(a)
≤ H(W n, L0|C) +H(M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |L0, C)
−H(W n|Xn, Y n, C)−H(M ′1s ⊕M
′
K)
≤ H(L0|C) +H(W
n|L0, C) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)−H(W
n|Xn, Y n, C) − nR′K + nδ(ǫ)
≤ H(L0|C) +H(W
n|Un(L0)) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)−H(W
n|Xn, Y n, C) − nR′K + nδ(ǫ)
(b)
≤ H(L0|C) + nH(W |U) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)−H(W
n|Xn, Y n, C) − nR′K + nδ(ǫ)
≤ nI(U ;X,Uh) + nH(W |U) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)− nH(W |X,Y )− nR
′
K + nδ(ǫ)
MC1
= nI(U ;X,Uh, Y ) + nH(W |U) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)− nH(W |X,Y )− nR
′
K + nδ(ǫ)
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MC3
= nI(U ;X,Y ) + nI(U ;Uh|X,Y ) + nH(W |U) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)
− nH(W |X,Y,U) − nR′K + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(W,U ;X,Y ) + nI(U ;Uh|X,Y ) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)− nR
′
K + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(W,U ;X) + nI(W,U ;Y |X) + nI(U ;Uh|X,Y ) + nI(V ;X|U,Z,Uh)− nR
′
K + nδ(ǫ). (13)
(a) uses the fact that M ′1s⊕M ′K is independent of all other random variables due to M ′K being uniformly
distributed and independent of other random variables. (b) follows from application of Lemma 3 (see proof
of Proposition 2 in Appendix B) to the third term. The conditions required for application of Lemma 3 are
satisfied as, from the rates given and the encoding process, P((Unh , Un, V n,Xn, Y n, Zn,W n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )→
1 as n→∞.
For the second term, we have
− I(Y n;W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK ,M
′
1s ⊕M
′
K |X
n, C)
= −H(Y n|Xn) +H(Y n|Xn,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(Y n, Lh, L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
= −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
+H(Y n|Xn,W n, L0, L1,Mk, Lh, C) +H(Lh|X
n,W n, L0, L1,MK , C)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
+H(Y n|Xn,W n, V n, Un, Unh ) +H(Lh|X
n,W n, V n, Un,MK)
(a)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
+ nH(Y |U, V,X,W,Uh) +H(Lh|X
n,W n, V n, Un,MK) + nδ(ǫ)
(b)
≤ −nH(Y |X) +H(L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
+ nH(Y |U, V,X,W,Uh) + nI(Uh;Y )− nI(Uh;X,W,U, V )− nRK + nδ(ǫ)
(c)
≤ −nH(Y |X) + nI(V ;Y |U,X,W ) + nI(V,U,X;Uh|Y )
+ nH(Y |U, V,X,W,Uh) + nI(Uh;Y )− nI(Uh;X,W,U, V )− nRK + nδ(ǫ)
= −nH(Y |X) + nI(V ;Y |U,X,W ) + nI(V,U ;Uh|Y,X)
+ nH(Y |U, V,X,W,Uh) + nI(Uh;Y )− nI(Uh;X,W,U, V )− nRK + nδ(ǫ)
≤ −nH(Y |X) + nI(V ;Y |U,X,W ) + nI(V,U ;Uh|Y,X)
+ nH(Y |U, V,X,W,Uh) + nI(Uh;Y |X,W,U, V )− nRK + nδ(ǫ)
= −nI(Y ;U,W |X) + nI(V,U ;Uh|Y,X) − nRK + nδ(ǫ). (14)
(a) follows from application of Lemma 3 to the third term. It is again straightforward to verify that
the conditions required for application of Lemma 3 are satisfied from the rates given and the encoding
process.
(b) follows applying Lemma 4 to the last term, with R˜ = I(Uh;Y ) + 3δ(ǫ), RK ≤ I(Uh;Y ) −
I(Uh;X,W,U, V ) and W˜ = (X,W,U, V ). The conditions required for application of Lemma 4 in (b)
follow from the rates given and the encoding process.
In (c), we upper bound H(L1|Xn,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C) as follow.
H(L1|X
n,W n, L0,M1o,M1s ⊕MK , C)
≤ H(L1|X
n,W n, L0, C)
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= H(L1|L0, C) +H(X
n,W n|L0, L1, C)−H(X
n,W n|L0, C)
≤ H(L1|L0, C) +H(X
n,W n|Un, V n)−H(Xn,W n, L0, C) +H(L0|C)
(i)
≤ H(L1, L0|C) + nH(X,W |U, V )− nH(X,W )−H(L0|X
n,W n, C) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ H(L1, L0|C) + nH(X,W |U, V )− nH(X,W )− I(L0;Y
n|Xn,W n, C) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ H(L1, L0|C) + nH(X,W |U, V )− nH(X,W )− nH(Y |X,W ) +H(Y
n|Un,Xn,W n) + nδ(ǫ)
(ii)
≤ H(L1, L0|C) + nH(X,W |U, V )− nH(X,W )− nH(Y |X,W ) + nH(Y |U,X,W ) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ nI(V,U ;X,Uh) + nH(X,W |U, V )− nH(X,W )− nH(Y |X,W ) + nH(Y |U,X,W ) + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(V,U ;X,Uh)− nI(U, V ;X,W )− nI(U ;Y |X,W ) + nδ(ǫ)
MC2
= nI(V,U ;X,Uh, Y,W )− nI(U, V ;X,W ) − nI(U ;Y |X,W ) + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(V,U ;Uh, Y |X,W ) − nI(U ;Y |X,W ) + nδ(ǫ)
= nI(V ;Y |U,X,W ) + nI(V,U ;Uh|Y,X) + nδ(ǫ)
MC1
= nI(V ;Y |U,X,W ) + nI(V,U,X;Uh|Y ) + nδ(ǫ).
(i) and (ii) follow from application of Lemma 3.
Combining the bounds for the two terms in (13) and (14) into (12) then leads to the upper bound on
the information leakage rate, which then completes the proof of achievability for Proposition 8.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Define N(w˜n, k) := |{l : Un(l) ∈ B(k), (Un(l), w˜n) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ }|. Define E1 = 1 if N(W˜ n,K) > a
and 0 otherwise. Let E2 = 1 if (W˜ n, Un(L)) /∈ T (n)ǫ and 0 otherwise. Observe that by assumption,
P(E2 = 1)→ 0 as n→∞. We now focus on upper bounding E1.
P(E1 = 1) ≤
∑
w˜n∈T (n)ǫ ,k
P(E1 = 1, W˜
n = w˜n,K = k) + P(W˜ n /∈ T (n)ǫ )
≤
∑
w˜n∈T (n)ǫ ,k
P(N(w˜n, k) > a, W˜ n = w˜n,K = k) + ǫn
≤
∑
w˜n∈T (n)ǫ ,k
P(N(w˜n, k) > a) + ǫn. (15)
Now, we use a version of the Chernoff bound, found in [15, Appendix B]. Let X1,X2,X3, . . . ,Xm be
i.i.d. binary random variables with P(Xj = 1) = p. Then,
P

 m∑
j=1
Xj ≥ m(1 + δ)p

 ≤ exp(−δ2mp/4)
for δ ∈ (0, 1). Now, let m = 2nR˜ and let Xj be the indicator function of the event
{Un(j) ∈ B(k), (Un(j), w˜n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ }. We note that Xjs are i.i.d. binary random variables since the
binning is done uniformly at random and Un(j) is generated according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui) for all j. Next,
since the binning is done uniformly at random, independent of all other random variables, P(Xj) =
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P(Un(j) ∈ B(k)).P((Un(j), w˜n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ ). Hence,
p = 2−nRK P((Un(j), w˜n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ )
≥ 2−nRK2−n(I(U ;W˜ )+δ1(ǫ
′))
for n sufficiently large. The second step follows from the statement of lemma 4, which, in turn, follows
from the conditional typical lemma [15, Chapter 2].
Applying the Chernoff bound to (15) with a = (1 + δ)mp, we obtain
P(E1 = 1) ≤
∑
w˜n∈T (n)ǫ ,k
exp(−δ22n(R˜−RK−I(IU ;W˜ )−δ1(ǫ
′))/4)
≤ |T (n)ǫ (W˜ )|2
nRK exp(−δ22n(R˜−RK−I(IU ;W˜ )+δ1(ǫ
′))/4).
By assumption, R˜−RK − I(U ; W˜ ) > δ1(ǫ′) and hence, P(E1 = 1)→ 0 as n→∞. We therefore have
H(L|K, W˜ n) ≤ H(L,E1, E2|W˜
n,K)
≤ 2 + P(E1 = 0, E2 = 0)H(L|W˜
n, E1 = 0, E2 = 0,K)
+ 2nR˜P(E2 = 1) + nR˜P(E1 = 1)
≤ n(R˜−RK − I(U ; W˜ ) + δ(ǫ))
for n sufficiently large.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
For the converse, consider an (n, 2nR, 2nRh) code achieving (D + ǫn,∆ + ǫn). The lower bound on
Rh is trivial. For R, we have
nR ≥ H(M)
≥ I(Xn;M |Zn,Mh)
= I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)− I(Xn;Mh|Z
n)
(a)
= I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)
= I(Xn;M,Mh, Xˆ
n|Zn)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Xˆ
n|Zn,Xi−1)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Xˆ
n, Zni+1, Z
i−1,Xi−1|Zi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Xˆi|Zi).
In (a), we used the Markov Chain assumption Y −W −Z −X. (b) follows from the fact that sources
are i.i.d..
For the information leakage rate, the lower bound n∆+ nǫn ≥
∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Wi) is straightforward to
show. We also have
n∆+ nRh + nǫn ≥ I(X
n;M,W n) +H(Mh)
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= I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M |W n) +H(Mh)
(a)
= I(Xn;W n) + I(Zn,Xn;M |W n) +H(Mh)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M |Zn,W n) +H(Mh)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M,W n|Zn)− I(Xn;W n|Zn) +H(Mh)
(b)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M |Zn) +H(Mh)
= I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)− I(Xn;Mh|M,Z
n) +H(Mh)
≥ I(Xn;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)
≥ I(Xn;W n) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Xˆi|Zi).
(a) and (b) follow from the Markov Chain assumption Y −W −Z−X. The last step follows the same
arguments used in lower bounding R. Now, let Q ∼ U [1 : n] independent of other random variables and
define (XQ, YQ, ZQ,WQ) = (X,Y,Z,W ) and XˆQ = Xˆ. We have
nR ≥ nI(XQ; XˆQ|ZQ, Q)
≥ nI(X; Xˆ |Z)
≥ nRSI−Enc(D + ǫn).
The last step follows from E
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xˆi)/n = E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D+ǫn and the fact that RSI−Enc(D+ǫn) =
min I(X; Xˆ |Z), where we minimize over p(xˆ|x, z) satisfying E d(X, Xˆ) ≤ D + ǫn. Similarly, we have
n∆+ nRh + nǫn ≥ nI(X;W ) + nRSI−Enc(D + ǫn).
Finally, noting that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ and using the fact that RSI−Enc(D) is continuous in D [15,
Chapter 11], we obtain the stated bound in the Proposition. This completes the proof of converse.
For the achievability, we use Proposition 8 and set Uh = ∅ and U = ∅. Using the assumption
that RSI−Enc(Z) = RWZ(Z), there exists an auxiliary random variable V ∗ such that V ∗ − X − Z ,
I(V ∗;X|Z) = RSI−Enc(D) and E d(X, xˆ(V ∗, Z)) ≤ D for some reconstruction function xˆ(V ∗, Z). We
set V = V ∗ in Proposition 8. It is now straightforward to verify that Proposition 8 achieves the stated
R.D.I. region.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12
For the converse, using the fact that Y −W − Z −X and following the same steps as the proof of
converse for Proposition 10 in Appendix G, we can show that
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥ I(X; Xˆ |Z),
∆ ≥ max{I(X;W ), I(X;W ) + I(X; Xˆ |Z)−Rh},
for PXˆ |X,Z satisfying E(X − Xˆ)
2 ≤ D constitute an outer bound to the R.D.I. region. Now, using the
condition that E(X − Xˆ)2 ≤ D, we have
I(X; Xˆ |Z) ≥ h(X|Z) − h(X − Xˆ)
≥
1
2
log
(
σ2Xσ
2
A
(σ2X + σ
2
A)D
)
.
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Hence, the outer bound reduces to
Rh ≥ 0,
R ≥ [
1
2
log
(
σ2Xσ
2
A
(σ2X + σ
2
A)D
)
]+,
∆ ≥ max{
1
2
log
(
σ2X + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
,
1
2
log
(
σ2X + σ
2
A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
+
1
2
log
(
σ2Xσ
2
A
(σ2X + σ
2
A)D
)
−Rh}.
For the achievability, using Proposition 8, we set U = Uh = ∅ and let σ2X|Z =
σ2
X
σ2
A
(σ2
X
+σ2
A
) . We then
set V = X + V ′, where V ′ ∼ N(0, σ
2
X|Z
σ2
X|Z−D
) for D ≤ σ2X|Z . Then, we have V − X − (Z,W, Y ) and
it is straightforward to verify that the Proposition 8 achieves R.D.I. region with this choice of auxiliary
random variables. The case of D > σ2X|Z is straightforward and this completes the proof.
APPENDIX I
PROOFS OF CONVERSE FOR COROLLARIES 2, 5 AND 7 UNDER BLOCK LOG-LOSS CONSTRAINT
Proof of converse for Corollary 2 under block log-loss
Given a (n, 2nR) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆+ ǫn), it is easy to show using inequality (6) that
nR ≥ nH(X|Y )− n(D + ǫn),
n∆+ nǫn ≥ nI(X;Z).
Further, we have
n∆+ nǫn = I(X
n;Zn) + I(Xn;M |Zn)
= I(Xn;Zn) + I(Xn, Y n;M |Zn)− I(Y n;M |Xn, Zn)
≥ nI(X;Z) + I(Xn;M |Y n, Zn)− nH(Y |X,Z)
≥ nI(X;Z) + nH(X|Y )− nD − nǫn − nH(Y |X,Z).
The last step uses the Markov Chain assumption X − Y − Z and inequality (6) on H(Xn|Y n,M).
Noting that ǫn → 0 as n→∞ then completes the proof of converse.
Proof of converse for Corollary 5 under block log-loss
Given a (n, 2nR) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆+ ǫn), we have, using inequality (6)
nR ≥ nH(X|Y,Z)− n(D + ǫn),
n∆+ nǫn ≥ nI(X;Z).
Further, following the same arguments to the proof of converse for Corollary 2 under block log-loss in
the previous section,
n∆+ nǫn ≥ nI(X;Z) + nH(X|Y,Z)− nD − nǫn − nH(Y |X,Z).
Noting that ǫn → 0 as n→∞ then completes the proof of converse.
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Proof of converse for Corollary 7 under block log-loss
Given a (n, 2nR, 2nRh) code that achieves (D + ǫn,∆+ ǫn), we have
nRh ≥ 0, n∆+ nǫn ≥ nI(X;Z).
Further,
nR ≥ I(Xn;M |Mh, Z
n)
≥ H(Xn|Zn,Mh)−H(X
n|Zn,Mh,M)
≥ nH(X|Z)− nD − nǫn.
The last step follows from Y −W−Z−X and inequality (6). For the information leakage rate, following
the proof of converse for Proposition 10 in Appendix G we have
n∆+ nRh + nǫn ≥ I(X
n;W n) + I(Xn;M,Mh|Z
n)
≥ nI(X;W ) + nH(X|Z)− nD − nǫn.
The last step follows from inequality (6). Noting that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ then completes the proof of
converse.
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